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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: IS IT TIME TO ABOLISH THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
IN PATENT CASES?
Hon. Diane P. Wood*

Good afternoon. Let me begin by thanking the Chicago-Kent Law School
for the opportunity to share some unconventional thoughts with you about the
way in which we have been handling patent appeals for more than thirty years.
Whether you think that is a long time or a short time probably depends on how
old you are: most of the people who are still in law school were not even born
when Congress decided to assign all true patent appeals to the Federal Circuit,
and so they will naturally think that we’ve had this system forever; old-timers
like me can remember the previous regime, when the regional circuits handled
patent appeals just as they do all other appeals (indeed, when I was a law clerk
on the Fifth Circuit, my last assignment was a case concerning plant patents!).
But either way, we should all be able to agree that there is nothing inevitable
about the current system. And so, I’d like to spend my time this afternoon
exploring the question whether it is time to abolish the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. For those of you simply interested in
the bottom-line, I will spare you the suspense: I believe the answer is “Yes.” I
hope that this does not cause you to think that my topic is so fanciful that you
would be better off spending the next twenty minutes or so texting or checking
your emails. In fact, as I propose to show you, there are better ways to solve the
problems that this branch of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction was
designed to address, and, at a broader level, our understanding of intellectual
property (IP) itself has shifted and deepened since 1982 in a way that pushes us
back toward the unification of judicial responsibility for the field as a whole.
As I have already mentioned, the Federal Circuit came into existence in
1982, with the passage of the Federal Courts Improvement Act.1 That Act gave
the new court exclusive jurisdiction over three types of appeals in patent cases:
(1) appeals from district courts in cases “arising under” the patent; (2) appeals
from decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office’s Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences; and (3) appeals from investigations of the International Trade
Commission into the importation of goods that allegedly infringe a U.S. patent.2
This work comprises the largest part of the court’s present docket. Yet the
*
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Federal Circuit is not a “specialized” court in the same sense as is the Complex
Commercial Litigation Division of the Delaware Superior court or the Labor
Court in France. Instead, it is a court (like all federal courts) of limited
jurisdiction, but its areas of competence are more tightly defined. Perhaps
because it was worried about “over-specialization,” or perhaps more simply
because it needed a home for the other idiosyncratic cases that had belonged to
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the old Court of Claims (the
Federal Circuit’s predecessors), Congress also assigned to the Federal Circuit
responsibility for various other types of cases: Tucker Act cases, unfair trade
cases, government contract cases, and cases concerning federal workers, to
name a few. In fact, fifty-seven percent (57%) of the court’s current docket is
not patent-related: it is, instead, entertaining appeals from tribunals, such as the
Court of Federal Claims, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.3 Whether it has actually been helpful to assign this
hodgepodge of cases to one court—the Federal Circuit—is debatable.4
Before it is possible to make any judgments on that question, we need to
go back in history and review why Congress chose to give the Federal Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in the first place. The standard account
focuses on three main goals.
The “central purpose” of the Act, according to the House Judiciary
Committee’s report on the Federal Courts Improvement Act, was “to reduce the
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in
the administration of patent law.”5 Uniformity has its allure in most areas of law.
As long ago as 1816, Justice Story invoked the “importance, even necessity of
uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States” in his opinion in
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.6 But, Congress saw the lack of uniformity in patent
law as a particular concern. The lack of “nationally binding decisions” on issues
of patent law, it believed, was giving rise to “widespread” forum-shopping.
This, in turn, made “effective business planning [im]possible,” since “the
validity of a patent [might depend] upon geography (i.e., the accident of judicial
venue).”7 Some more recent studies have questioned whether disuniformity and
forum-shopping were really such great problems in the 1970s,8 but this, at least,
is the standard account. As the country emerged from a period of economic
stagnation, Congress was persuaded that it was necessary for the courts to speak
3
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in one voice in order to maintain and foster the United States’ competitive
advantage in innovation and especially in the burgeoning technology fields.9
Of course, uniformity says nothing about quality or accuracy. A broken
clock tells the time with impeccable uniformity: the only problem is that it is
right only twice a day. (I realize the delicacy of saying that an appellate court
reaches the “right” or “accurate” answer; I use the terms here in the same way
that Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss did: as a description of “whether the
law . . . is . . . responsive to the philosophy of the Patent Act, to national
competition policies, and to the needs of researchers and technology users.”10).
The advocates of the 1982 legislation thought, however, that it would be
beneficial in this particular way to have patent appeals adjudicated by
specialists, rather than generalist judges. By “removing these unusually complex
[and] technically difficult . . . cases from the dockets of the regional courts of
appeals” and placing them in the hands of judges who were more familiar with
patent law and the policies animating it,11 Congress thought that the judicial
system would produce better results.
Finally, there is the related efficiency rationale. From 1960 to 1973, the
number of cases terminated in the courts of appeals increased almost four
hundred percent (400%), and this upward trend continued throughout the
1970s.12 Patent cases are often complicated, and no doubt many judges were
happy to have such appeals deleted from their dockets. Parties with a stake in
patent cases—like all litigants who come into any court—were also interested in
receiving speedier justice. These concerns over accuracy and efficiency,
however, were not new; nor were they in any way unique to patent litigation.
This is what Judge Learned Hand—no intellectual slouch—had to say on the
subject in a 1911 opinion addressing the patentability of purified adrenaline:
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the
law which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the
rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these. The
inordinate expense of time is the least of the resulting evils, for only a
trained chemist is really capable of passing upon such facts, e.g., in this
case the chemical character of Von Furth’s so-called “zinc compound,” or
the presence of inactive organic substances . . . How long we shall
continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but all

9
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5 (1989)).
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fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought,
I should think, unite to effect some such advance.13

Judge Hand’s concerns about competent handling of sophisticated expert
testimony are just as salient today as they were when he wrote these words; that
task, however, is no more or less difficult in patent cases than it is in complex
environmental cases, Food and Drug cases, antitrust cases, or many others. In
the patent field, Congress believed that assigning exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to the Federal Circuit would be an effective way to address all three of the
concerns I have identified. Interestingly, the business community was a
powerful advocate for the 1982 legislation, as one can see from the postenactment comment of the United States Chamber of Commerce that the Federal
Circuit was “The Court American Business Wanted and Got.”14
With that background in mind, we are set to consider whether—no matter
what the original intentions, aspirations, or expectations—the experiment has
worked, or on the other hand, whether we should put it to rest. My critique relies
in large part on three of the leading legal thinkers of our times: the Dixie Chicks,
Robin Thicke, and Burt Bacharach.
As Dixie Chicks’ fans in the audience will know, the chorus of the song
“Wide Open Spaces” (their third single off their debut album in 1998) tells the
story of a young woman striking out on her own, somewhere out West. The
chorus goes:
She needs wide open spaces
Room to make her big mistakes
She needs new faces
She knows the high stakes . . .15

Think about it: room to make her big mistakes. Author Henry Petroski
makes much the same point in his book, To Engineer is Human: The Role of
Failure in Successful Design. The virtues of uniformity have their limits. No one
wants to live in an echo chamber, and no thinker or innovator will get very far
surrounded by a bunch of yes-men. The Supreme Court learns valuable lessons
about which cases are the hardest, and which are most worthy of certiorari, by
watching the development and resolution of conflicts in the circuits or the state
supreme courts. Patent law, too, needs “wide open spaces/room to make [its] big
mistakes.” Mistakes teach valuable lessons; they can reveal where the cracks in
the foundation are and how they should be fixed. A proposition that seems
obvious to one person might seem questionable to another, ambiguous to a third,
and flatly wrong to a fourth. As in the song, percolation is needed despite (or
maybe because of) the high stakes.
13

Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
See Gugliuzza, supra note 3, at 1454 n.85.
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Some examples help to make this point. One critical area of patent law is
claim construction: every patent must contain “claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor
regards as the invention.”16 As anyone who has even brushed by patents will
know, articulating claims can be a devilishly tricky exercise—one that
“fundamentally require[s] that technological ideas—inventions—be captured
(precisely!) by language, and later ‘de-translated’ back into their technological
essence by those other than the inventors.”17 Yet, for all the talk of “uniformity,”
the Federal Circuit itself has had great difficulty settling on a methodological
approach for interpreting claims.18 (This is not to criticize the court: observers of
the regional circuits spot intra-circuit conflicts from time to time, despite our
best efforts to use the en banc process and other mechanisms to keep circuit law
straight.) Scholars have used different labels to describe the Federal Circuit’s
approaches—”holistic” versus “procedural,” “pragmatic textualism” versus
“hypertextualism”—but it’s not the terms that matter. As Professors Craig Allen
Nard and John F. Duffy have argued, “in a polycentric model, the value and
soundness of these interpretative approaches would be put to the test. The
competition among circuits would likely give rise to a consensus methodology
(which may be an entirely new posture), add resolution to the benefits and
shortcomings of existing approaches, or present the Supreme Court with a
clearer picture of the claim construction landscape.”19
The same goes for the Federal Circuit’s “nonobviousness” jurisprudence.
§ 103 of the Patent Code provides that a patent cannot issue on subject matter
that would have been “obvious” to a hypothetical “person having ordinary skill
in the art.”20 The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area has been subjected
to significant criticism. Many have suggested that “the standard of
nonobviousness is now so low, new technologies spawn thickets of patent rights
on marginal improvements,” effectively imposing “a heavy tax on invention and
discourag[ing] entry into innovative enterprises.”21 Again, this is an area where
several circuits’ elaboration of competing viewpoints might prove useful:
perhaps there are different ways, better ways, to approach nonobviousness.
Speaking from my own experience, I can assure you that circuit splits and
disagreements with colleagues force judges to sharpen their writing, push them
to defend their positions, and from time to time persuade them that someone
16

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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Id. at 1656–57.
20
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else’s perspective is preferable. This process of testing and experimentation is
lost when uniformity is privileged above all other values.
At the risk of introducing unwanted controversy into this talk, my second
“intellectual giant” in patent law is Robin Thicke, whose #1 hit “Blurred Lines”
has swept the airwaves, YouTube, and other media this year.22 Before you faint,
let me assure you that I am well aware of the nature of this “song.” And I have
no use for the misogynism of the lyrics and, in particular, the ugly and
insensitive allusions to rape. But, I’ll bet that the people in this room under the
age of thirty or thirty-five know about it; apparently there have already been 143
million viewings on YouTube!! So, I will use it here for its title and underlying
message: lines that we thought were sharp are nothing of the kind.
The argument in favor of a specialized court for patent appeals is that this
is an area where an expert court is particularly beneficial. But that proposition is
contestable from several standpoints. First, the lines between the law governing
patents and the law governing other forms of intellectual property law
(copyright, trademark law, trade secret law, and so on) are blurring. For
example, software is commonly protected under copyright, but some software
might be patented. For many years, business methods were trade secrets, but
now they are patentable. At the most general level, the same basic policies
animate all aspects of our intellectual property regime: the idea that notional
boundary lines need to be drawn around valuable property that individuals
create, and the belief that the definition of such property rights “promotes longterm cultural and technological progress better than a regime of unbridled
competition.”23 Judges on the regional courts of appeals are accustomed to
working with these principles when they arise in copyright or trade secret cases,
matters in which a patent is involved only as an asset under a license, and cases
in which the patent issue arises only as a defense to the plaintiff’s claim,24 just to
name a few. In short, there are many ways in which the different forms of IP are
all part of one real-world transaction.25 So why we should treat patent law
differently is a puzzle.
If the answer is simply that patent appeals are much more difficult than
any other type of case that comes before the courts, there are two responses.
First, how much harder are they (in theory), and what makes them so? We have
not adopted specialized trial courts for patent cases; they go before the district
22

ROBIN THICKE, Blurred lines, on BLURRED LINES (Star Trak 2013).
J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 475 (1995).
24
See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
834 (2002). In Vornado, the Supreme Court also precluded Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over patent issues that were stated only in counterclaims, but Congress legislatively
overruled that result for compulsory counterclaims in Pub. L. No. 112-29, Sept. 16, 2011.
25
J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994).
23
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courts, who manage the expert witnesses and data collection with the same tools
they use for other complex litigation. Both the district courts and the regional
courts of appeals routinely deal with all manner of difficult, technically complex
subjects. If there are doubters among you, I would direct you to the Seventh
Circuit’s recent opinion in Bernstein v. Bankert,26 in which we clarify (in over
seventy-six pages) what events trigger the availability of a § 113 contribution
claim under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (or CERCLA), and when the party must instead resort to a § 107
claim for cost recovery. And Bernstein was no different from any other
CERCLA opinion you might find from any circuit. Or, you could pick up
practically any telecommunications decision—or a computer-software copyright
case, or a thorny antitrust dispute, or some petitions for review under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. (The field of immigration, it is worth noting,
is another area where one could argue there is a pressing need for courts to
speak with “a unified national voice.” Yet, it is the regional courts of appeals—
appropriately so, in my view—who are responsible for petitions for review from
the Board of Immigration Appeals.).
Even though these cases are complex, there is great value in obtaining the
views of a number of judges, and there is great value in using generalist judges.
Law, in the final analysis, governs society. It should not be an arcane preserve
for specialists, who never emerge to explain, even to their clients, what the rules
are or why one side or the other prevailed. It is the responsibility of the parties to
present their cases in a comprehensible form to the tribunal—just as it is the
responsibility of the judges to delve into the record, apply fair rules of
procedure, consider burdens of proof, and come to sound results. Patent cases
are no worse (and no better) than cases arising in many other areas. While there
may be some gains from specialization, and while many of the civil law nations
have opted for this approach, there are losses too. Traditionally, we have found
that the costs of specialization are not worth its benefits. I remain convinced that
this continues to be true, at least in our legal culture.
Although patent claims may involve very complicated technology, the
basic legal principles are relatively straightforward. Indeed, “[w]ith only a few
exceptions, the [patent code] does not distinguish between different technologies
in setting and applying legal standards.”27 Cases requiring the assistance of those
with expert “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to understand
underlying factual matters occur every day in the federal courts; that’s why we
have Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The fact that the line between
patent law and other areas of law is indeed a blurred one needs to be borne in
mind when we talk about the need for specialization (which, in turn, relates to

26

2013 WL 3927712, at *13 (7th Cir. July 31, 2013).
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1575, 1576 (2003).
27
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the accuracy and efficiency rationales I set forth at the beginning of my talk)
and the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over these appeals.
Finally, we can turn to my third great legal theorist, Burt Bacharach, and
his well-known treatise on IP entitled, “(There’s) Always Something There to
Remind Me.” Some of the younger people in the audience may know this from
the cover by the British New Wave band Naked Eyes (1983),28 but the song has
been around much longer than that—it was first recorded by Dionne Warwick in
1963.29 Specifically, I want to flag the following passage:
When shadows fall I pass a small café
Where we would dance at night
And I can’t help recalling
How it felt to kiss and hold you tight
Oh how can I forget you
When there is always something there to remind me
Always something there to remind me

Much like the mournful protagonist of this work, the federal courts of
appeals haven’t quite gotten past patent appeals either, for there is “always
something there to remind [us]” of them.
That is because of the messy fact that, in truth, the Federal Circuit does
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all things-patent: the regional circuits are
still called upon to resolve patent questions quite frequently in cases that do not
technically “arise under” the patent laws. For instance, until 2011, even
compulsory patent counterclaims did not “arise under” the patent laws.30 Even
though Congress amended the patent laws to address this issue—relaxing
slightly the well-pleaded complaint rule, in effect—patent issues are often
embedded in suits in other ways.31 For example, courts may be required to
address underlying issues of patent law to resolve a state-law malpractice claim.
The Supreme Court recently held in Gunn v. Minton32 that the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive appellate jurisdiction does not extend to such appeals.

28
NAKED EYES, (There’s) Always Something There to Remind Me, on BURNING
BRIDGES (EMI 1983).
29
DIONNE WARWICK, (There’s) Always Something There to Remind Me, on THE
WINDOWS OF THE WORLD (Rhino 1967).
30
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831–34
(2002), abrogated by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011)
(“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States
. . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a
compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant
variety protection.”).
31
See, e.g., Cnty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir.
2007).
32
133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2012).
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To be clear, I am not saying that regional courts systematically would do
a better job of handling patent law in these situations, or that they necessarily
would resolve these questions more expeditiously. My point is simply that the
regional courts continue to exercise authority over these “reminders” of patent
law, and it has not brought our patent regime to its knees.
So what should we do instead? You will note that the title of my talk is
not whether we should abolish the Federal Circuit, or even whether we should
strip it entirely of its patent jurisdiction. My question is a more modest one:
should we eliminate its exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, and re-introduce
into the country the same kind of marketplace of ideas at the court of appeals
level that we have for almost every other kind of claim. Under the alternative
regime I envision, parties would have a choice: they could take their appeals to
the Federal Circuit, thereby benefiting from that court’s long experience in the
field, or they could file in the regional circuit in which their claim was first filed.
This is the Fleetwood Mac model: “You can go your own way.” 33
The system I propose is similar to the one that is available in labor law
cases, where the parties have a choice of where they may seek review of the
National Labor Relations Board’s decisions. Under the National Labor Relations
Act, “any person aggrieved” by a final order of the NLRB may obtain a review
of the order (1) in a court of appeals where the alleged unfair labor practice
occurred; (2) in a court of appeals where the party “resides or transacts
business”; or (3) in the D.C. Circuit.34 If both parties are “aggrieved” (say, the
Board agrees that six of the employer’s alleged unfair labor practices occurred,
but not the seventh), then there is a potential dilemma. If the Union, based in
Orlando, Florida, wanted to seek review of a recent board order, it would most
likely want to proceed in the Eleventh Circuit, where the President’s recess
appointments are viewed as valid.35 Walt Disney, the employer of the union
members, might prefer to file in the D.C. Circuit, which recently ruled that the
President’s appointments were constitutionally invalid under the Recess
Appointments Clause.36 But, in these “race to the courthouse” situations, there is
a reasonable and effective solution: if two petitions are received within ten days
of the Board order, the agency must notify the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML), which will then randomly select one or the other.37
Something similar could be constructed for patent appeals. The
alternative is not a return to the “bad old days” in which a single patent might be
valid in the Second Circuit and invalid in the Tenth at the same time. The
“aggrieved party” could be given the option of seeking review either in the
Federal Circuit or in the regional circuit with jurisdiction over the district court
33
34
35
36
37

FLEETWOOD MAC, Go Your Own Way, on RUMOURS (Warner Bros. 1977).
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2006).
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2006).
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from which the appeal is taken.38 If there are cross-appeals or multiple pending
appeals around the country pertaining to a single patent, and they are in different
circuits, the procedure outlined by 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) could be adapted to
allow the JPML to select one forum for that patent or that case. This would
address the valid concern about the possibility of inconsistent decisions
addressing the same patent or litigant. One court would be responsible for that
particular case, but the development of the law would benefit from a variety of
viewpoints.
Such a regime would have a number of advantages. Many of the benefits
that accrue from specialization will remain. It is possible—maybe even likely—
that the Federal Circuit would still play a leading role in shaping patent law. Its
opinions would be closely watched by regional circuits, just as the D.C. Circuit
exercises leadership in various aspects of administrative law because it hears so
many such cases. The absolute number of patent cases that would return to the
regional courts would not be large; there is, thus, no reason to expect that this
change would have much of an effect on time to disposition. But, on the positive
side, the change would provide those “wide open spaces” for development of
patent law, allowing new ideas to percolate and grow. The Supreme Court
would also have the benefit of fuller development in the lower courts and, thus,
more information about which cases warrant one of the scarce slots in its annual
docket.
The way in which patent law might develop in these different regional
circuits should itself be instructive. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have argued
that in certain industries—software and biotechnology, for example—the
Federal Circuit’s application of common legal standards (obviousness,
enablement, and written description) “has gotten the policy precisely
backwards.”39 It is entirely possible that the Ninth Circuit, where a
disproportionate share of these cases arises, would be better attuned to these
policy considerations.
Speaking personally, I would welcome the re-integration of intellectual
property law in the regional circuits. I hope that I have persuaded you that the
kind of change I am proposing is at least possible and that it could be
accomplished without a return to the negative aspects of the pre-1982 regime. In
any event, it has been a pleasure to be here, and I wish you the best with this
year’s Supreme Court IP Review.

38
39

See id. § 41.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 27, at 1577–78.

